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Recommendations
\ Flexible mapping and tracing tools
Instead of rigid certification procedures that create 
high administrative burdens on state and economic 
actors, priority should be given to flexible and reliable 
instruments of mapping and tracing that smelters 
can use for their supply chain due diligence. In 
conflict regions, certificates risk being tainted by 
reports of fraud, as the challenges to governance can 
be expected to be similar to those in the Great Lakes 
region.
\ An enabling policy approach  
to artisanal mining
A policy approach that enables rather than prohibits 
artisanal mining is better suited to providing market 
access to informal artisanal mining that does not have 
links to armed actors. Legality should not be made 
a precondition for recognising artisanal mines as 
conflict-free to avoid punishment of an entire sector 
for the links to conflict financing of a few.
\ Mandatory due diligence  
requirements
To reach the objectives stated in the draft legislation, 
the European Union has to make due diligence on 
“conflict minerals” mandatory for EU companies. This 
will increase the demand for “conflict-free” minerals, 
which will act as an incentive for speeding up local 
mapping and tracing efforts and the return of smelters 
to the DR Congo.
\ Due diligence by end producers 
Downstream companies are in a position to conduct 
due diligence with marginal to manageable costs, 
despite the complexity involved. The competitive 
disadvantage of European companies towards Asian 
companies is more imaginary than real.
\ Indispensable accompanying  
measures  
For due diligence legislation to be effective in conflict 
regions, EU actors ought to support multi-stakeholder 
initiatives on the ground that have greater credibility 
than government or industry schemes. 
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In the weeks and months ahead, the European parlia-
ment has a decisive role in reaching meaningful 
European legislation on the responsible sourcing of 
minerals from conflict regions. In mid-May 2015, it is 
due to vote on an EU regulation drafted by the 
European Commission. The stated objectives of the 
draft legislation are to (1) contribute to decreasing the 
financing of armed actors via the proceeds generated 
in the mining sector of conflict-affected and high-
risk areas, by (2) enhancing the ability of EU down-
stream companies to conduct due diligence, with the 
effect of (3) contributing to reduced distortions in the 
mineral markets of the Great Lakes Region (European 
Commission, 2014, p. 32). 
The Commission proposal for a EU regulation cham-
pions voluntary due diligence requirements for im-
porters of tin, tantalum, tungsten (3T) and gold from 
all conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The latter are 
defined as areas identified by the presence of armed 
conflict, widespread violence, including violence gen-
erated by criminal networks, or other risks of serious 
and widespread harm to people, based on the OECD 
Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains 
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas. The requirements to conduct due diligence 
with regard to conflict minerals in the Commission’s 
proposal also follow the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.
The current discussion among European policymakers, 
industry and civil society groups is very much di-
vided on the question of a voluntary or mandatory ap-
proach to due diligence and narrower or wider sec-
tions of the supply chains to be targeted. According to 
the Commission’s impact assessment (2014), the ra-
tionale for a voluntary due diligence system is the 
following:
   \ Companies trying to conduct supply chain due 
diligence in compliance with the US Dodd-Frank 
Act1 have encountered significant challenges.
1 \ Section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (DFA) requires companies listed on the US stock exchanges 
to provide specific assurances that any products that they have manu-
factured or contracted to manufacture do not contain minerals that 
“originated from the DRC or one of its adjoining countries controlled 
by armed groups or financing those. Neither directly nor indirectly” 
(p. 842). The term ‘‘armed group’’ means “an armed group that is identified 
as perpetrators of serious human rights abuses” (DFA, SEC 1502, p. 843).
   \ Official buyers have withdrawn from the Great 
Lakes region because of the DFA, causing the 
fall in local prices of the targeted minerals 
(“market distortions”, de facto embargo).
   \ When forced again to conduct due diligence 
along the supply chain, companies are feared 
to withdraw even further from buying miner-
als from the Great Lakes region.
   \ Companies are still prepared to implement due 
diligence on a voluntary basis.
Contrary to the Commission’s assessment, we argue 
that the fear of market distortions (the de facto em-
bargo following US and Congolese regulations) can no 
longer be used to justify voluntary measures. What is 
at stake now, is the return of conflict-free smelters to 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):
   \ Compared to mandatory rules voluntary mea-
sures have proven to be ineffective.
   \ Creating a market for conflict-free minerals 
can help to overcome the de facto embargo.
   \ Mandatory legislation is vital, as it increases 
the demand for conflict-free minerals.
   \ Without increasing the demand for conflict-
free minerals (downstream), incentives to in-
crease the supply may stagnate on the ground 
(upstream). Both fields of action—downstream 
and upstream—are thus mutually 
interdependent.
   \ Supply chain due diligence is feasible for down-
stream and upstream actors, as tracing 
schemes are being implemented globally and 
in the Great Lakes region. If the European 
Union and its members require companies to 
conduct due diligence and boost their support 
for mapping and tracing initiatives in conflict 
regions, the legislation can be effective in 
meeting its stated objectives. 
This Policy Brief provides insights that support this ar-
gument. While searching for the best technical solu-
tion to enhance due diligence practices, it has to be 
kept in mind that due diligence alone cannot achieve 
the wider objective of furthering peace and security. 
EU actors should work towards this objective with a 
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comprehensive peacebuilding agenda, which centres 
on the livelihood opportunities of the population of 
conflict zones. 
Different context, different effects
The European Union need not be afraid of causing 
another de facto embargo. As context and content of 
EU legislation differ from section 1502 of the US 
Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), the effects will also differ. 
Still, the current discussion about the mandatory or 
voluntary nature of EU legislation is informed by the 
perceived consequences of this earlier US legislation: 
The introduction of due diligence requirements for 
US-listed companies sourcing from the DRC and 
neighbouring countries, i.e. the Great Lakes region, 
has led to a deterioration in the economic and secur-
ity situation in eastern DRC contrary to the hoped for 
end of conflict financing in that region. In fact, not all 
of the negative effects were directly caused by the 
DFA, as a ban on all mining activities was declared in 
parallel by the Congolese government, with tremend-
ous consequences. But in the general perception, 
these are all consequences attributed to this US 
legislation.  
The current global context is different from the situ-
ation in June 2010, when the US law was passed. Back 
then, many smelters stopped buying tin, tantalum 
and tungsten from North and South Kivu and 
Maniema provinces in the DRC, as the Congolese gov-
ernment had suspended mining activities in these 
provinces between September 2010 and March 2011. 
In addition, the implementing rules for the DFA were 
still unknown, creating uncertainties, while the op-
tion of buying minerals from other countries than 
the DRC and its neighbours (“DRC-free”) existed. In 
combination, this caused the de facto embargo on 
Congolese minerals. So today, the question is about 
how to overcome that “embargo” and no longer 
about how to avoid it.
While challenges persist, sourcing responsibly is 
easier in the current context, because processes to 
trace and certify minerals are in place and partly 
operational in the Great Lakes region and globally. 
Due diligence requirements on responsible sourcing 
of minerals from conflict-affected regions thus no 
longer need to frighten companies as they did in 2010, 
when there was no supply of conflict-free minerals. 
Existing schemes and processes to trace minerals 
back to mines in eastern DRC include a mapping 
exercise that continuously monitors mine sites for 
the involvement of armed actors, the regional certi-
fication scheme of the Great Lakes Region that 
defined the criteria of conflict-free minerals, and the 
closed-pipe systems from mine to final product 
(“Conflict-free tin initiative” and “Solutions for Hope” 
for coltan).
The draft EU legislation is greater in scope, as it cov-
ers all conflict-affected and high-risk areas, while the 
DFA equates conflict minerals with minerals funding 
conflict in the DRC. Accordingly, companies could 
comply with the requirements of the DFA simply by 
stating that their products were DRC-free. This par-
ticularity of the DFA also explains in great part the de 
facto embargo on the DRC. By being global in scope, 
the draft EU regulation has made it much more diffi-
cult to simply withdraw from one region to fulfil due 
diligence requirements. The list of regions that poten-
tially fall under the definition of conflict-affected and 
high-risk areas is rather long: For the year 2013, the 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Re-
search lists 68 cases of violent conflicts related to nat-
ural resources (www.hiik.de). 
Supply chain due diligence can be  
complex, but it is feasible
Following European companies’ complaints about 
challenges in conducting due diligence along the 
supply chain, the EU Commission opted for a policy 
option that incentivises voluntary due diligence by 
importers of minerals and metals (semi-finished 
goods). This considerably reduces the effectiveness of 
the legislation: the number of European companies 
targeted would be just around 500, as the number of 
economic players is much smaller at the beginning 
than further down the supply chain (end-producers) 
(see Figure 1). EU legislation could affect “up to 
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   \ Complete technical software solutions to im-
plement due diligence for confl ict minerals 
have been made commercially available. They 
automatically collect responses from all suppli-
ers of a company.
   \ The bigger the company the more complex the 
supply chain. At the same time, larger compa-
nies incur less relative costs of conducting sup-
ply chain due diligence.
   \ Regardless of confl ict minerals legislation, 
some companies need to know the origin of the 
minerals used for their products for reasons of 
quality assurance.
Despite the fact that “high costs” are prominently 
cited as one of the major reasons to back away from 
mandatory legislation, the estimates of costs for sup-
ply chain due diligence are rated as “marginal” to 
“manageable” by most respondents to a survey com-
missioned by the European Commission in 2013. 
Business respondents—the majority of whom were 
either end-producers or manufacturers of semi-
fi nished products—estimated expenditures predom-
inantly at €13,500 for initial eff orts and €2,700 for 
subsequent ongoing eff orts. This corresponds to 
0.014% (initial costs) and 0.011% (annual recurrent 
costs) of turnover (European Commission, 2014). Most 
respondents were users of the automated software 
tool for conducting due diligence. 
SMEs are able and not unwilling per se to conduct 
confl ict minerals due diligence 
While the protection of small and medium-sized 
companies (SMEs) is used as a main argument in fa-
vour of preventing mandatory rules, those SMEs who 
participated in the public consultation organised by 
the European Commission (July 2013) were quite 
open to the idea of binding legislation. Interestingly, 
60% of large companies were against mandatory 
rules, whereas 48% of medium-sized and 52% of small 
companies were in favour (European Commission, 
2014). Importantly, smaller companies face less com-
plexities in their supply chain, although they incur 
higher relative costs when conducting due diligence 
than larger businesses.
800,000” companies (European Commission, 2014, 
p. 79), if it extended requirements to end-producers 
within the industrial sectors that process tin, tan-
talum, tungsten and gold.
In fact, companies situated at the downstream part of 
the supply chain—from producers of alloys to produ-
cers of fi nal products—do not need to trace the origin 
of minerals they use to comply with due diligence re-
quirements. All they need to do is to identify the 
smelters in their supply chain and ask for confl ict-
free guarantees from them, including information on 
the region of origin of the minerals. Smelters (of the 
3Ts) and refi ners (of gold) are the choke points in the 
supply chain because once smelted or refi ned, min-
erals can no longer be traced to their origin.
Figure 1  
Upstream and downstream segments of the mineral 
supply chain 
Source: Manhart, A. (2013). Conﬂ ict Minerals. An evaluation of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and other resource-related measures. 
presentation by Öko-Institut at brussels, 3 september 2013, 
p.20. (http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1819/2013-491-en.pdf)
The complexity of the task for some large companies 
cannot be denied. One challenge prominently cited 
in the EU Commission’s impact assessment are mul-
ti-tier supply systems, i.e. companies with several 
sub-suppliers that have no direct contact to smelters 
and the many products (inputs) that need to be 
traced. The complexity is, however, greatly relativised 
when the following facts are considered: 
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are not required to address conflict minerals by law 
(i.e. not US-listed) and those that are no direct suppli-
ers to US manufacturers hardly take any steps to en-
sure that their supply chains are free of minerals that 
contribute to armed conflict and grave human rights 
abuses. While some large brands implement compre-
hensive due diligence along their supply chains, the 
majority of European companies who use the four 
minerals do not yet seem to feel the necessity. But 
this is bound to change when more Asian suppliers to 
US-listed companies start to implement Dodd-Frank 
rules, and European companies wanting to supply 
metals, components, or machinery to these manufac-
turers cannot compete.
Only very few companies of those addressing conflict 
minerals actively source non-conflict minerals from 
the Great Lakes region, according to a 2013 study by 
Öko-Institut. Smelters and refiners that are certified 
through the Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSI), 
World Gold Council or the London Bullion Market As-
sociation, use management systems that avoid any 
sourcing from the DRC or any adjoining country. 
Hence, to substantially increase the number of 
European companies conducting supply chain due 
diligence, European legislation needs to be manda-
tory and to cover more sections of the supply chain 
than purely the importer level. The more companies 
conduct due diligence, the more difficult it will be to 
avoid buying minerals from the DRC—particularly 
Congolese tantalum, which represents about 15 to 
20% of the world’s supply.
EU support for mapping and 
traceability efforts in the Great Lakes 
region and beyond is necessary
It is vital to boost the demand for conflict-free miner-
als from the Great Lakes region and to overcome re-
maining problems regarding the implementation of 
conflict-free certification in the DRC. There is still 
hardly any general infrastructure to trace artisanally 
mined minerals from mine to export, e.g. the trading 
centres in-between mines and export that are meant 
to be building blocks for a conflict-freee supply chain 
The weak bargaining position of SMEs when request-
ing information on conflict minerals from their sup-
pliers is another recurring theme evoked by opponents 
to mandatory EU due diligence requirements. Manda-
tory legislation could strengthen the bargaining posi-
tion of European companies requesting information 
from their non-European suppliers, as the European 
Union is a relatively large importer of 3Ts and gold 
metals with a 23% and 13% share of global trade re-
spectively (European Commission, 2014). In addition, 
the EU Communication that lays the ground for the 
draft regulation and accompanying measures (“JOIN 
(2014) 8 final”) already foresees funding possibilities 
for the self-certification scheme of SMEs to be ex-
plored within the Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
SME’s Programme (COSME).
the competitive disadvantage for European  
companies is more imaginary than real
European companies claim a competitive disadvant-
age as compared to operators in countries such as 
China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brazil where most of 
the economic actors are reported to continue to 
source from conflict areas without exercising due dil-
igence. This statement ignores the fact that suppliers 
of US-listed companies—both manufacturers and 
smelters—are already under pressure to implement 
conflict minerals due diligence. There is only one 
European tin smelter among those certified through 
the Conflict-Free Smelters Program (CFSI). Most certi-
fied smelters are based in Asia, which is home to 
about 65% of the 280 known smelters worldwide for 
tin, tantalum and tungsten. Moreover, with manda-
tory due diligence requirements for European smelt-
ers, EU downstream companies could better serve US 
clients’ due diligence requests, keeping them from 
turning to other compliant suppliers. 
Voluntary due diligence requirements 
are not effective
Mandatory requirements appear necessary because 
the majority of companies do not voluntarily apply 
conflict minerals due diligence along their supply 
chains. A 2013 study by SOMO found only limited 
spin-off effects of the DFA: European companies that 
How to EnFoRCE DUE DILIGEnCE? \ MARIE MüLLER-koné, LEnA GUEsnET 
6 \ \ poLICy bRIEF 2 \ 2015
created a considerable momentum among Congolese 
and international stakeholders. The European Union 
should work to keep up this momentum by putting 
weight behind the “accompanying measures” men-
tioned in the EU Communication, instead of giving in 
to the difficulties. Relevant action includes support 
for multi-stakeholder monitoring and tracing 
in-country are too few in number. There are contin-
ued reports that conflict minerals are mixed with 
certified minerals (both in the DRC and Rwanda). 
Legal uncertainty surrounds artisanal mining in 
eastern Congo because most mining areas are covered 
by industrial mining concessions handed out during 
and after the two Congo Wars, often under dubious 
circumstances. The Congolese state sets the legal re-
quirements for artisanal miners very high—e.g. 
miners have to be registered as co-operatives—and at 
the same time hardly provides for artisanal mining 
zones, the only places where artisanal mining can be 
exercised in full respect of the law. As conflict-free 
minerals initiatives make legality a precondition, the 
entirety of the artisanal mining sector has been pun-
ished. In addition, political structures in the DRC and 
other conflict-affected and high-risk areas work 
much more along the principles of informal politics 
(what Congolese call la débrouille) than principles of 
the rule of state law. Some high-ranking officials have 
links to established smuggling networks. 
Despite these hurdles, the transnational efforts of 
mapping, tracing and certification to eliminate the 
links of the Congolese artisanal mining sector to con-
flict financing and the worst forms of abuse have 
Box 1 
Artisanal minining in eastern DRC
In eastern DRC, artisanal mining is the most important coping mech-
anism and survival strategy for about one million people, as there are 
few alternative livelihood options. The local economy depends to a large 
extent on the income and expenditure of miners. 
With the drastic decline in local prices for tin, tantalum and tungsten 
following the exit of many companies from the DRC after 2010, the 
large majority of artisanal miners have moved to the gold sector. Its 
small size and high value render gold easy to smuggle and attractive to 
armed groups and bandits, which is why intermediate traders tend to 
fear for their security when using official, more visible channels. 
Involvement by non-state armed groups or the Congolese army was 
reported for over 500 cases out of 1088 surveyed mining sites by the 
end of 2014. Out of these, the army was involved in 313 mining sites. 
Source: IpIs (2014). Analysis of the interactive map of artisanal 
mining areas in eastern DR Congo: May 2014 update: http://www.
ipisresearch.be/download.php?id=452
initiatives and targeted support to artisanal miners 
through local civil society organisations. For compa-
nies it is important to note that due diligence should 
be seen as an ongoing process, the aim of which is to 
monitor the local situation as closely as possible and 
to take mitigating action where necessary.
overcoming the de facto embargo by 
mandatory due diligence requirements 
for EU companies 
The situation of a de facto embargo (or “trade distor-
tions”), caused by global smelters and refiners ceasing 
to purchase minerals from eastern DRC, can only be 
overcome if, first, all efforts are geared to boosting the 
demand for conflict-free minerals from the Great 
Lakes region and, second, the supply of such minerals 
is increased to meet the demand.
EU legislation can only be effective in that sense, if 
due diligence requirements for EU companies are 
mandatory and encompass a greater section of the 
downstream part of the supply chain. Due diligence 
requirements could be extended to companies listed 
on EU stock exchanges—approximately 1,000 out of 
the 7,959 EU-listed companies. At a minimum, due 
diligence on conflict minerals could be included 
under the reporting requirements of the existing EU 
Directive on non-financial reporting (Directive 
2014/95/EU), which applies to large companies.
EU Member States have already endorsed the volun-
tary OECD Guidance on which the EU legislation in 
question is based. Current due diligence practices by 
companies and the limited number of European im-
porters of minerals and metals performing it suggest 
that the proposed voluntary importer requirements 
will only lead to a marginal increase in the demand 
for conflict-free minerals. In this regard, the planned 
How to EnFoRCE DUE DILIGEnCE? \ MARIE MüLLER-koné, LEnA GUEsnET  
7 \ \ poLICy bRIEF 2 \ 2015
registration and market access of informal artisanal 
miners who do not have links to armed groups or the 
military. Such an approach builds on the formalisa-
tion of existing practices and aims at working with 
miners to improve their compliance with the law, in-
stead of prohibiting their activities. It includes tech-
nical support for artisanal miners to improve work-
ing conditions, to limit environmental damages they 
cause and to find alternative income opportunities. 
This will make the identification of problematic prac-
tices much easier than if an entire sector is driven 
underground.  It is also better suited to address the 
informal politics of regulating the mining sector typ-
ical of many conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
Finally, efforts to regulate the mineral trade must be 
part of a broader peacebuilding agenda, for they alone 
cannot end resource-related armed conflicts. Such an 
agenda needs to address root causes and other factors 
beyond the mineral sector that motivate people to 
continue fighting. Where mining provides for the 
majority of livelihood options, basic livelihood neces-
sities of people living in conflict regions need to be 
prioritised and weighed against the objective of con-
taining armed groups, because the sudden loss of in-
come opportunities provides the ground for conflict 
motives. 
list of certified European importers can help manu-
facturers of semi-finished or final products to con-
duct supply chain due diligence. However, only if 
European companies further downstream are re-
quired to conduct due diligence will refiners and 
other suppliers outside of Europe feel a substantial 
increase in demand for conflict-free guarantees, 
which will increase the bargaining position of indi-
vidual European companies seeking information 
from them.
Mandatory requirements cannot scare European 
companies away from buying minerals from the DRC 
because they don’t source directly from the country 
but rely on smelters most of which have already 
withdrawn from the region. Now, they can exert 
leverage through smelters in their supply chain to 
source conflict-free minerals. Sourcing conflict-free 
minerals from the Great Lakes region can be cost-
effective for companies, as costs for conducting sup-
ply chain due diligence are manageable, and prices 
for minerals from conflict regions are generally 30 to 
40% below world market average. 
The successful return of smelters to the region will in 
turn depend on the success of mapping and tracing 
initiatives on the ground. Consequently, there needs 
to be continued and increased support by EU actors 
for local mapping and traceability efforts, as political 
structures in conflict-affected and high-risk areas 
tend to render the implementation of such initiatives 
difficult. The minerals targeted by the legislation are 
not the only source of income for armed actors, and 
armed actors as well as artisanal miners can adapt 
quickly to changing market patterns. Therefore, 
European legislation should leave room to include a 
wider range of natural resources produced in conflict-
affected and high-risk areas.  
outlook
A paradigm shift is needed with regard to the regula-
tion of artisanal mining in the DRC and elsewhere: 
An approach that enables rather than prohibits arti-
sanal mining is better suited to facilitating 
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